On July 5 of this year, the leaders of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) member-states met in the capital of Kazakhstan. The SCO was created in the beginning of 1990s to deal with revision of former Soviet-Chinese border issues. At that time, the organization was comprised of China and four former Soviet countries bordering with China – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russian Federation and Tajikistan. By 2005, Uzbekistan, and four semi-members with observer status – India, Iran, Mongolia, and Pakistan-- were added to the fold.
Writing for the Kavkaz Center, Jean Tealy Jr. thinks the US government should take a closer look at the strategic meaning of this recent SCO meeting for former Soviet states, China, and Iran. In fact, Tealy is fairly clear about the possibilities:
Iran is a country that has been trying to expand its influence in Central Asian region since the collapse of the Soviet Union. But surely it is a bit strange to see Iran in one club with Russia and China – its major rivals in the “struggle for Central Asia". One of the most important resolutions adopted in Astana at the summit of Shanghai Cooperation Organization was about request to the US leadership to outline the schedule of dismantling U.S. military bases in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. That was a clear challenge to U.S. Foreign Policy and its military presence in Central Asian region. That is also an explicit answer to the question why Iran is an observer within SCO. The Washington-Tehran stand-off has been lasting for more than quarter century now. It is clear that for Iran it is more convenient to be at odds with U.S. in the company of Russia and China rather than to do that alone.
Perhaps Russia's evolving relationship with China is mutating into longer-term arrangement? After all, the Bush administration has made official statements about the violations of human rights in both Russia and China, so both China and Russia would benefit from a potential counter-weighting relationship.
In a unipolar world, international relations models (as well as Leda Cosmides' research on coalitional psychology) suggest that state actors will collaborate to counter the power of the dominant state. The case for strong relations between China and Russia is easily made. Immediately following 9-11, US-China relations looked to benefit from mutual hard line anti-terrorist policies. So why is China pulling away? (On that note, Professor Yu Bin authored an interesting article-- "Tale of Two US Partners: Coping with Post-Taliban Uncertainty"-- which gives the context for earlier consensus-building SCO meetings, as well as laying out the security interests of China and Russia vis a vis the US.)
